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This is an excellent analysis of how the Padres finally stopped being the Friars of yesteryear. I think there's some really interesting takeaways one might glean from their process.

1. If there's one overarching lesson I could take from this saga, it'd be to adapt quickly and never be reluctant to admit a mistake or a flaw in process. If there's one thing it seems like Preller has mastered, it's the art of selling high- James Shields is always gonna be the biggest example, but the fact that he was willing to use Urias's residual prospect sheen to get Grisham AND Davies is one of the deftest moves I think he's yet made. At this point, Grisham looks like a solid contributor at worst and a sneaky star at best, and Davies gave the Padres a mid-rotation quality year and then helped them get Darvish. Meanwhile, Urias looks like a disaster. An absolute fleecing to this point at least.

2. Invest in the international market, big and small. The Pads have gotten a big contingent of their prospect surge from overseas, and they did it by both ponying up for premium talent (Morejon) and finding cheap gems with scouting (Patino). I think its an interesting comparison point for the Giants- Luciano and Matos (and Pomares, though he seems to have been a bit passed by) were big-ticket signings, while Canario and Toribio were not. The Giants under Farhan have seemed to embrace a philosophy of spreading their bonus money around and not pinning the hopes of a class on one or two prospects. Obviously the international market is different now and you can't just throw as much money around as you want, but I'll be curious to see what fruit that approach bears. The Giants recent success at finding unheralded gems would seem to bode well for it, but I can't help but be a little put out at two signing periods where the Giants haven't been linked to any "top 30" guys, when the last time they were seems to have worked out extremely well for them so far. It seems like you could always do both, though I know deals are locked up years in advance, so maybe the Giants just haven't been as fortunate with the premium guys lately. Yet that hasn't seemed to be the case with orgs like the Dodgers.

3. Focus on prospects who have at least one "carrying tool." I might be looking at this wrong, but from what I can tell, the Padres have seemed to prioritize finding guys who have at least one tool that can easily be graded plus, whether that's power (Franmil, Tatis, Naylor, Renfroe), speed (Turner, Edwards, Abrams), pure hitting ability (Urias, Grisham wrt strike zone discipline), or in pitching prospects, a plus fastball and a plus offspeed pitch (Lamet, Paddack, Baez.) Patino and Gore don't exactly fit that description because they're unicorns who are expected to do everything well at their peak, but both of them do have exceptional fastballs, Gore for its backspin and deception and Patino for pure gas. That makes pretty intuitive sense to me- you always want a prospect to have something you can safely bet on them doing well at the MLB level. The Giants have seemed to hew a bit closer to that philosophy in the draft once Farhan took over- Bishop's got crazy power, Wyatt has a great eye, Grant McCray's fast as hell. Patrick Bailey's a bit more rounded, though you could argue his carrying tool is "catcher", but Casey Schmitt is a plus defender, Nick Swiney seems to have at least one plus offspeed pitch (not sure whether consensus likes his curve or change better though) and great secondary fastball traits, and RJ Dabovich throws gas with spin. Harrison's another well-rounded upside play, but largely, this seems to be a philosophy the Giants are adopting.

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The problem here is that we don’t have the draft position this year that SD had in 2018.

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